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Expanding the Use of Environmental
Trading Programs into New Areas of
Environmental Regulation
RICHARD E. AYRES*
AYRES LAW GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Global warming is the most recent, and potentially largest,
example of the difficult choices that face environmental policy
makers. On one hand, scientists foretell major changes in the
earth's climate with extraordinary consequences expected for
human civilization and the planet's ecosystems, unless emissions
of greenhouse gases are not curtailed.' On the other hand, the
economies of the developed world depend on fossil fuels, and any
major shift away from fossil fuels would be extremely disruptive.2
New forms of marketable permit systems may offer a means
of dealing with such difficult and seemingly incommensurable
tradeoffs. Such market-based measures are being increasingly
viewed as the answer to the dilemma of how to provide the envi-
ronmental protection Americans demand at a reasonable cost. The
Acid Rain Control Program that was adopted in the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments is the largest environmental trading pro-
* Ayers Law Group, Washington, D.C. The writer wishes to acknowledge the
encouragement and assistance of Public Service Electric & Gas Company, a subsidi-
ary of Public Service Enterprise Group, in the preparation of this article.
1. See generally World Bank, Global Climate Change Home Page, at http'/www-
esd.worldbank.org/ccd (last modified Dec. 14, 2000) (provides background information
on the global climate change issue).
2. It is not difficult to identify many such dilemmas in environmental policy
where the cost of any given level of environmental quality improvement could be re-
duced if workable market mechanisms can be devised. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) recently proposed, for example, that States employ a "cap and trade"
mechanism in the nitrogen oxide (NOx) emission control program that is being re-
quired of States in the eastern half of the country. See Proposed Rules, EPA 63 Fed.
Reg. 56,356 (Oct. 21, 1998). A similarly intractable situation is posed by the current
argument about protecting estuarine life from the effects of power plant cooling
systems.
1
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gram enacted so far.3 The Acid Rain Control Program, which em-
ploys the trading of government-issued certificates that represent
emissions of sulfur oxides, has already delivered significant envi-
ronmental and economic benefits.4 The question presented in this
article is how to obtain potentially greater benefits from transac-
tions where the products being traded are more difficult to value.
Emission reductions from the acid rain program have already
surpasssed requirements at a fraction of the cost predicted by
many when the program was adopted.5 Environmental trading
programs have become popular in federal legislation, and have
been adopted by a number of States in both air and water pollu-
tion programs.6 Most recently, the United States and other na-
tions proposed an environmental trading program for dealing with
emissions of greenhouse gases.7
While trading programs are increasingly common, the volume
of trading (except in the acid rain control program)8 has been sur-
prisingly small.9 Based on a review of the experience with trading
programs, this article identifies the major issues that determine
3. See generally Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy
of Market Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & ECON.
37 (1998).
4. See U.S. EPA PUB. 430-R-98-012, 1997 COMPLIANCE REPORT: ACID RAIN PRO-
GRAM (1998) [hereinafter ACID RAIN PROGRAM).
5. See id. According to the EPA, the 423 units subject to the program emitted
4.77 million tons of S02 in 1997, twenty-three percent less than the allowable level for
the year. Meanwhile the price of emission "allowances" remained below $200 per ton,
a fraction of the predictions made by some when Congress was considering the legisla-
tion. See id. at 8. See also Dallas Burtraw, Cost Savings, Market Performance, and
Economic Benefits of the U.S. Acid Rain Program, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE Dis-
CUSSION PAPER, 98-28-REV (September 1998). But see Anne E. Smith et al., The Cost
of Reducing S0 2 (It's Higher Than You Think), PUB. UTIL. FORT. (May 15, 1998); A.
DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER THE U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM:
EVALUATION OF COMPLIANCE COSTS AND ALLOWANCE MARKET PERFORMANCE, MASS.
INST. TECH. CENTER FOR ENERGY AND ENVTL. POLICY RESEARCH (1997).
6. See generally ACID RAIN PROGRAM, supra note 4.
7. See Non-Paper on Principles, Modalities, Rules & Guidelines for an Interna-
tional Emissions Trading Regime, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change,
8th Sess., Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SB/1998/MISC.1JAdd.1 (1998), available at
http://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/1998/sb/misc01al.htm (Canada on behalf of Aus-
tralia, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation and the United
States of America submitted this report).
8. See ACID RAIN PROGRAM, supra note 4. According to EPA, 7.9 million S02 al-
lowances were traded between unaffiliated entities in 1997.
9. See Robert Hahn & Robert Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regula-
tion: A New Era from an Old Idea? 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 16 (1991). For example, the
Michigan emission-trading program ended 1998 with a total number of trades for the
year of only 20. In many cases, trading is actually prohibited between those with the
highest and lowest marginal costs of pollution reduction. See generally ENERGY AR-
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whether trading programs will actually achieve their objectives.
This article argues that the "commodity paradigm" that underlies
the successful acid rain program is, ironically, the principle im-
pediment to obtaining the full potential benefits of trading.10 It
suggests that to obtain these benefits, a significant effort should
be made to develop agreed-upon methods for demonstrating ac-
ceptable quality in emission products that will allow extension of
environmental trading into the areas where the potential benefits
are greatest.
The economic benefits of trading are the result of the differ-
ences in the cost of reducing emissions from different kinds of
sources - "arbitrage," in economics jargon." For example, it may
be far less expensive, on a cost per ton basis, to use low sulfur fuel
in two generating units to obtain a given emission reduction than
to install a scrubber on one.' 2 A trading program provides a
mechanism for substituting the less expensive alternative.' 3
Environmental trading potentially offers many advantages
besides lower costs. Environmental trading programs provide:
" Incentives for those with low compliance costs to reduce
their pollution to lower levels than required, and to make
the reductions earlier than required;
* An economic stimulus to develop new, less expensive
means of meeting environmental standards - by providing
a market for technologies that achieve emissions reductions
at a cost lower than the market price for credits; and
" A means to eliminate the need for individual variances or
exemptions.1a
GUS, INC., AIR DAILY, 1, 9 (Nov. 10, 1998) available at http://www.energyargus.com/ad.
htm.
10. See Richard E. Ayres, A Market In Emission Credits Incrementally: An "Open
Market" Paradigm For Market-Based Pollution Control, 25 BNA ENVTL. REP. 1522
(1994).
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. The recent shortages of electricity in California have demonstrated this
strength. The use of higher-emitting "peaking" electronic generating plants has pro-
duced emissions in excess of the allowances available in southern California's "RE-
CLAIM" program. Under such circumstances, command and control systems
invariably resort to issuing variances, in effect simply accepting the additional public
health risk posed by excessive emissions. The logic of markets, however, demands
"repayment" for the allowances "borrowed" by the excessive emissions. Because of the
market based RECLAIM program, air pollution officials have been able to require the
utilities to fund efforts to mitigate the public health risk associated with the excess
emissions.
2000]
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Environmental trading can also help lower the decibel level
and enhance the rationality in environmental policymaking.
Trading establishes a market price for achieving a given environ-
mental goal. With more accurate information about the cost of
reaching pollution control goals, policymakers can make more in-
formed policy decisions with respect to such goals. In turn, this
will mean there will be less room for the kind of battle of wildly
disparate claims that are a staple of today's environmental
debates. 15
The larger the benefit, the greater the arbitrage between the
trading partners. For example, the current price of publicly
traded acid rain allowances which represents the arbitrage availa-
ble under the currently-applicable control regime, is under $200
per ton at this writing.16
But this arbitrage is small compared to the potential in other
situations. As air and water pollution control regulations become
increasingly demanding on industrial sources and motor vehicles,
the arbitrage between them and the largely unregulated "area"
sources has grown increasingly large.' 7 Emission reductions from
"area sources" of air pollution (small engines, lawn mowers,
barbecues, consumer products, and the like), which account for
about one-sixth of emissions nationally, have been largely passed
up so far.'8 The cost of further incremental nitrogen oxide (NOx)
emission controls on automobile engines, for example, are usually
estimated at thousands of dollars per ton.' 9 NOx reductions from
replacing existing gasoline-powered lawn mowers, which have no
15. See Hahn & Stevens, supra note 9, at 12, 13. Hahn and Stevens provide a
shorter list of benefits from "incentive-based" regulation: (1) lower cost; (2) improve
international competitiveness [seemingly a subcategory of (1), above]; (3) incentives to
develop new pollution control technologies; (4) make the terms of the environmental
debate more understandable to the general public. See Hahn & Stevens, supra note 9,
at 12, 13.
16. See ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 5. Even with such relatively small arbitrage,
impressive economic savings accrue. A careful analysis of one of the earlier years of
the system's operation, 1995, when allowance prices were less than $100, concluded
that the trading program saved twenty-five to thirty-four percent of the cost of a com-
mand and control system, or about $225-375 million. See also ACID RAIN PROGRAM,
supra note 4 (The EPA estimates annual savings of $2.3 to 3.8 billion in Phase II of
the acid rain program, which began in the year 2000).
17. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NONROAD ENGINE AND VEHICLE EMISSION
STUDY-REPORT 104 (1991) [hereinafter VEHICLE EMISSION STUDY].
18. See id. A 1991 EPA Report to Congress estimated that non-road engine emis-
sions of NOx amounted to fourteen percent of total NOx emissions, exceeded only by
on-highway engines and electric generation. See id.
19. For example, EPA estimated that the cost-effectiveness of its proposed "Tier
II" auto emission standards would be $1,748 ("long-term") to $2,134 ("near term").
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emission control technology, with electric mowers, which emit no
NOx, can be made at a fraction of the cost.20
In order to consider how such potential benefits might be real-
ized, it is necessary to examine existing trading systems and iden-
tify the critical design issues that must be resolved in order to
extend environmental trading beyond its current limitations.
I. Existing Trading Programs
In the late 1970s, regulators began grafting crude environ-
mental trading programs onto existing command and control envi-
ronmental regulatory structures. Since then, trading programs
have become more complex. Modern environmental trading pro-
grams are increasingly sophisticated, allowing for complex trans-
actions through third party brokers and credit manufacturers.
Most remain tightly circumscribed, however, in terms of who may
participate and what may be traded. For example, trades involv-
ing emissions from industrial facilities, on the one hand, and mo-
tor vehicles, on the other, are usually subject to close regulatory
supervision or prohibition. Few transactions involving industrial
water dischargers and non-point sources of water pollution have
been allowed. Transactions involving enhancement of habitat in
lieu of changes in industrial practices have been permitted in only
a handful of instances. The following is a survey, with some ex-
amples, of existing trading programs.
A. Air Programs
Environmental trading programs first appeared in the con-
text of air pollution regulation. 21 It is in this context that their
use is most widespread and their evolution most advanced.
1. Federal Air Programs
Air emission trading programs can be traced back to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) establishment of an air
emissions offset policy in 197622 for companies seeking to locate
new emission sources in areas classified as nonattainment for a
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) under the
See Proposed Rules, EPA 64 Fed. Reg. 26,004, 26,073 (proposed May 13, 1999). See
also Smith et al., supra note 5.
20. See VEHICLE EMISSION STuDY, supra note 17.
21. See Emission Offset Interpretative Ruling, 40 C.F.R. pt. 51 (1999).
22. See id.
2000]
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Clean Air Act. Congress expressly authorized offset programs the
following year in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.23
EPA conceived of the offset policy as a way to bring nonattain-
ment areas into attainment while minimizing the effect on eco-
nomic growth.24 Under the offset policy, which has evolved
considerably over the years, EPA may authorize an individual
company to construct a new major source (or modify an existing
one) provided it obtains more than equivalent emission reduc-
tions, or "offsets," from existing sources that contribute to nonat-
tainment, and provided that it meets certain other conditions. 25
To date, there have been more than ten thousand approved
offset trades, over ninety percent of them in California. 26 From
1985 to 1991, over ten thousand tons of offset, including NOx, par-
ticulates and SO 2, were traded in southern California. 27 Esti-
mated expenditures for the emission reduction credits were
approximately $2 billion.28
Following closely on the heels of the offset policy, EPA estab-
lished its so-called "bubble" policy in 1979,29 under which emis-
sions trading is allowed among existing units within the same
company, either in the form of intra-plant trades or intra-firm
trades (i.e. trades between different plants owned by the same
firm). Through this mechanism, a firm may meet an emission re-
duction requirement at one unit by reducing emissions at another.
For example, emissions might be reduced from one boiler where
control costs are low, rather than at small combustion units re-
quired to make collectively equivalent emission reductions.
Closely related to the bubble concept is "netting," which EPA
unveiled in 1980.30 Netting allows a source undergoing modifica-
tion to avoid "New Source Review" (NSR)31 if it can demonstrate
that net plant-wide emissions would not increase significantly
even with the increased emissions from the modified unit.
23. Clean Air Act (CAA) § 173, 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1994).
24. See generally id.
25. See Emission Offset Interpretative Ruling, 40 C.F.R. pt. 51.
26. See ROBERT C. ANDERSON ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE UNITED
STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION CON-
TROL POLICY, 6-2 (1997).
27. See id. at 6-4.
28. See id.
29. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,780 (Dec. 11, 1979).
30. 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(a)(1)(vi)(A) (1999).
31. 40 C.F.R. § 51.307 (1999). NSR requires a review of the air quality impact of
the changes being made, and the installation of "Best Available Control Technology"
(BACT).
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As part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress
significantly advanced the use of environmental trading programs
by establishing an air emission-trading program to address "acid
rain."32 The acid rain program is a tradeable permit system.33 Be-
ginning in the year 2000, the Act places a ceiling on total SO 2
emissions from electric utility units.34 An annual allotment of SO 2
emission "allowances" is awarded each year to each covered unit,
equal in total to the overall "cap."35 A covered utility unit that
emits less SO 2 than its allocated allowances can then bank those
reductions for later use or sell them to another utility unit with
emissions in excess of its own allocation of allowances.3 6 Once al-
located, allowances have a perpetual life. They may be used at any
time after they are allotted.3 7 Beginning in 2000, and each year
thereafter, a national total of 8.9 million tons of allowances will be
allocated each year.
2. State Air Programs
a. RECLAIM
The most comprehensive state environmental trading pro-
gram is in the Los Angeles area, which, since the 1950s, has had
the highest ozone levels in the nation.38 In 1991, the South Coast
Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD), which exercises ju-
risdiction over the 12,000 square mile air basin surrounding Los
Angeles, 39 introduced the concept of a marketable permit program
as part of its air quality management plan.40 By 1993, the pro-
gram evolved into the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market
(RECLAIM). 41
Like the acid rain program, RECLAIM was designed as a
tradeable permit program, including phased reductions in allot-
32. CAA §§ 403-405, 40 C.F.R. pt. 73 (1999).
33. See CAA §§ 403-405.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See CAA §§ 403-405, 40 C.F.R. pt. 73.
38. Houston passed Los Angeles for this distinction for the first time in the sum-
mer of 1999.
39. See generally AQMD, South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., http://www.aqmd.
gov (last modified Feb. 22, 2001).
40. See John P. Dwyer, The Use of Market Incentives in Controlling Air Pollution:
California's Marketable Permits Program, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 103 (1993).
41. See South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. District Rules 2000-2015 (1993), available
at http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/html/tofc20.html [hereinafter SCAQMD].
20001
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ments of emission allowances over the period 1994 to 2003.42 RE-
CLAIM was conceived of as an iterative program, with more
sources and pollutants to be included each year.43
RECLAIM's first iteration was in 1994. Trades were allowed
among 370 sources of NOx and forty sources of SO 2, representing
approximately seventy percent of stationary source emissions in
the Los Angeles basin. 44 Emission rights were allocated based on
a baseline of existing emission levels at the time the program was
adopted. 45 Each year from 1994 to 2003, sources in the program
receive a declining allocation of RECLAIM Trading Credits
(RTCs).46
b. Open Market Systems
In contrast to the "cap and trade" programs, established
under the acid rain and RECLAIM projects, several States have
adopted "open market" air emission trading programs. 47 In these
programs, the number and type of potential market participants is
not strictly circumscribed, as under cap and trade programs. 48
Open market programs, which have been enacted in New
Jersey,49 Texas, 50 and Massachusetts, 51 as well as in other
states,52 derived significant conceptual guidance from an Emis-
sions Trading Demonstration Project launched by the Northeast
States for Coordinated Air Use Management and the Mid-Atlantic
Regional Air Management Association, in the early 1990s (NES-
CAUM/MARAMA).53 The project was developed in the context of
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 6-9.
45. See id.
46. See SCAQMD, supra note 41, Rule 2002 ("Allocations for Oxides of Nitrogen
(NOx) and Oxides of Sulfur (SOx)").
47. See Ayres, supra note 10.
48. See id.
49. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, §§ 27-30.1 (1996).
50. See 30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 101.29(d) (West 1997).
51. See MAsS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 7.00 app. B (1993) (amended 1998).
52. Michigan, for example, enacted an open market air emission-trading program
in 1986. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 336.2201 (1986). The EPA, however, forced Michi-
gan to rework substantial parts of the program, thereby jeopardizing it. Proposed
Rules, EPA 62 Fed. Reg. 48972 (proposed Sept. 18, 1997).
53. See THE NORTHEAST STATES FOR COORDINATED AIR USE MGMT. & MID-ATLAN-
TIC REGIONAL AIR MGMT. ASS'N, EMMISSIONS TRADING DEMONSTRATION PROJECT PHASE
III (1996) [hereinafter NESCAUMIMARAMLA. NESCAUM is an association of State
air quality directors from each of the New England States, New York and New Jersey.
MARAMA is an association of State and local air quality directors from Pennsylvania,
[Vol. 18
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widespread ozone non-attainment in northeastern states.5 4 The
NESCAUMIMARAMA project analyzed the potential structure of
an open market air emission trading system and developed a set
of governing principles and policies for such a system. Several
emissions trades were consummated under the auspices of the
Demonstration Project, which informed the principles established
under the Project.55
Although the open market trading systems adopted by New
Jersey, Texas, and Massachusetts share some basic similarities
with both the NESCAJMIMARAMA system and with each other,
they differ with respect to important concepts.
All the systems rely on a registry, with mandatory notice fil-
ings, to track compliance and to facilitate market transactions.
Under the Texas system, for example, a Notice of Generation of
emission credits,56 a Notice of Intent to use such emission cred-
its,5 7 and a Report of Use58 must all be filed with a central
registry.
Currently, none of the systems authorize interpollutant trad-
ing, such as trading NOx credits to satisfy volitile organic com-
pound (VOC) requirements. Nor do any of the systems authorize
the use of credits to comply with the Clean Air Act's technology
requirements (BACT, LAER, or NSPS) 59 although the NES-
CAUM/MARAMA framework contemplates such uses.60 Use of
credits to avoid New Source Review is also prohibited in these
State open market systems.61 The NESCAUM/MARAMA proto-
type, but none of the State programs, contemplates using credits
created by emission reductions from mobile sources to comply
with enhanced vehicle inspection and maintenance programs. 62
In short, while emission trading systems are being adopted, the
permitted uses of credits are very circumscribed. Credits may
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina and the District of Colum-
bia. See id. at iii n.2.
54. See id. at i-ii.
55. See id. at 1-8. The trades have achieved nearly 14,500 tons of voluntary NOx
and VOC reductions during the summer ozone season, and 4,000 tons of voluntary
NOx reductions outside the ozone season. See id.
56. See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.29(d)(3)(C) (1997).
57. See id. § 101.29(d)(4)(F) (1997).
58. See id. § 101.29(d)(4)(G)(ii) (1997).
59. See CAA § 182.
60. See NESCAUM/MARAMA, supra note 53, at 3-3.
61. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, §§ 27-30.1; 30 TEx. ADMiN. CODE § 101.29 (d);
MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 7.00-app. B.
62. See sources cited supra note 61.
20001
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only be used to comply with RACT-based emission limitations; to
meet offset requirements under the new source review program
and, in New Jersey, to meet "alternative emission limits" (effec-
tively, a variance).6 3
The open market systems differ over whether to allow credit
generation from plant shutdowns or production curtailments. The
New Jersey system does not allow credits to be generated from
shutdowns or curtailments. The Massachusetts regime does allow
for such credit generation, but only if the credits are adjusted for
shifting demand and subject to other possible restrictions. The
Texas system allows credits to be generated from shutdowns but
not from curtailments.
The various open market systems also address the potential
for emission "spiking" differently.64 The NESCAUMMARAMA
group proposes a system of intertemporal trading, allowing trades
across ozone seasons, but not allowing trades where the credit is
generated outside an ozone season for use during an ozone sea-
son.6 5 The New Jersey and Texas systems, by contrast, require
that all credits generated within an ozone season be used during
that same ozone season (credits generated outside an ozone sea-
son are also barred from being used during an ozone season). The
Massachusetts program allows credits generated during an ozone
season to be used at anytime during the calendar year.66 And the
Texas system caps the number of emission credits that may be
used at any given time.67
While the NESCAUM/MARAMA, New Jersey, and Massachu-
setts systems authorize interstate trading, the Texas system does
not.68 The Texas system restricts intrastate trading as well, while
neither the New Jersey nor Massachusetts programs do So. 6 9 The
Texas and Massachusetts programs require users to obtain
63. See NESCAUMIMARAMA, supra note 53, at 2-11, 2-18.
64. 40 C.F.R. pt. 63, App. A. "Spiking" is a term used to identify a concern that if
credits may be "banked" for later use, a number of emitters could simultaneously
withdraw them from the bank on a hot day during an air pollution episode, to allow
increased electricity generation. The fear is that this will cause an emissions "spike"
at precisely the time when pollution loadings in the atmosphere are already excessive.
65. See NESCAUMMARAMA, supra note 53, at 1-7.
66. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 7.00.
67. See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.29(d).
68. See NESCAUM/MARAMA, supra note 53, at 1-3. See also ANDERSON ET AL.,
supra note 26, at 6-11, 6-12.
69. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 6-11, 6-12. Given the differences in
physical extent of Texas and the two Northeastern States, there may be effectively
more similarity among these systems than it might appear from the regulations.
[Vol. 18
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enough credits to assure a compliance margin, the NESCAUM/
MARAMA and New Jersey programs do not.70
The open market programs also define the products traded
differently. The New Jersey program allows trading of NOx and
VOC in increments of one-twentieth of a ton of reduction.71 The
Texas system uses increments of one ton for trading in NOx, VOC,
carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and particulates.7 2 The Massa-
chusetts program permits trading of NOx, VOC, and carbon mon-
oxide in increments of five tons.73
Each open market program establishes a different mechanism
for assuring the quality of the emission credits generated and
used. The NESCAUMIL/AARAMA project took the position that
the user should be responsible to demonstrate credit quality to
pollution control officials upon use.74 Thus, it would be the re-
sponsibility of the user to conduct sufficient due diligence at
purchase to assure that the credits represented real emission re-
ductions in excess of emission control requirements, properly
quantified and documented, and allowable for compliance in the
state of use.7 5 The due diligence would be entirely the prerogative
of the private parties to the transaction under the NESCAUM sys-
tem. 76 It might range from trusting the reputation and/or repre-
sentatives of the seller to third party audits or observations of the
credit creator's process. Whatever the diligence, the buyer would
have to convince the State of the quality of the credits.
The New Jersey system takes an alternative track, requiring
(1) the credit generator to prove the quality of credits (2) to an
independent verifier licensed by the State (3) before the credits are
used. 77 Texas combines elements of both the NESCAUM/
MARAMA and New Jersey frameworks. 78 Like New Jersey, it re-
quires the generator to prove the quality of emission credits prior
to use but, like the NESCAUMVMARAMA system, it also requires
the generator to make a showing to a regulatory body.7 9 Massa-
70. See NESCAUM/MARAMA, supra note 53, at vi-vii. See also ANDERSON ET AL.,
supra note 26, at 6-11, 6-12.
71. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 6-11.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See NESCAUM/MARAMA, supra note 53, at 2-9.
75. See id. at 2-16. (e.g., the reductions were undertaken in the proper season and
are not from prohibited types of sources).
76. See id.
77. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 §§ 27-30.10 (emphasis added).
78. See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE. § 101.29(d).
79. See id.
2000]
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chusetts requires both user and generator to receive approval
from a regulatory agency before reductions may be credited and
used.80
Thus, each state's program distributes the legal responsibility
for credit quality differently. The NESCAUM/MARAMA project
proposes user responsibility, making the user liable for assuring
the quality of emission credits.8 1 The generator would in turn be
answerable to the user through normal commercial contract en-
forcement mechanisms.8 2 Under the New Jersey system, the gen-
erator has responsibility for demonstrating credit quality.8 3 The
user is responsible only for complying with certain administrative
requirements.8 4 New Jersey's system is complicated by the pres-
ence of a State-mandated "independent verifier."8 5 Although the
verifier is responsible for ensuring that the notice is "true, accu-
rate and complete,"8 6 the scope of the verifier's liability is unclear.
Apparently, New Jersey intends to analogize the verifier to an au-
ditor, limiting the verifier's liability accordingly. The Texas pro-
gram, like that of New Jersey, ostensibly places primary liability
for credit quality on the generator. A user in Texas "should en-
sure"8 7 that the credits meet the applicable requirements for
purchase. The user must also engage in due diligence to verify
that the credits were not generated in an unauthorized manner.8
Thus, in reality, both creator and user may be answerable to the
Texas authorities for credit quality. Finally, the Massachusetts
requirement of State pre-certification effectively transfers liability
for the quality of credits to the State itself.8 9
B. Water Programs
Environmental trading programs are found in two areas of
water law: wetlands regulation and effluent trading.90 All of the
80. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 7.00.
81. See NESCAUM/MARAMA, supra note 53, at vi-vii.
82. See id.
83. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 §§ 27-30.1.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 101.29(d)(4)(H)(i).
88. See id.
89. See MAsS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 7.00, Appx. B(3).
90. See generally INST. FOR WATER RESOURCES, WATER RESOURCE SUPPORT
CENTER, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, IWR REP. 92-WMB-1, NAT'L WETLAND MITIGA-
TION BANKING STUDY, WETLANDS MITIGATION BANKING CONCEPTS [hereinafter WMB-
1] (1992); see also ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 26.
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Clean Water Act trading systems are open market systems where
"credits" are generated by taking environmentally beneficial ac-
tions that are not required by law or regulation. 91 None is a "cap
and trade" allowance-based system. Trading is more established
with respect to wetlands.9 2
1. Wetlands Trading
Wetlands are regulated under a complex web of federal and
state programs. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act 93 requires
permits for activities that adversely impact most wetlands. 94 If
adverse impacts on wetlands are unavoidable and wetlands miti-
gation is not possible on-site, then a permit applicant must find
another means to compensate for those adverse impacts.
Since the 1980s, federal and state regulatory agencies have
allowed some permit applicants to meet their mitigation require-
ments by purchasing wetlands "credits" from approved "wetlands
mitigation banks."9 5 These credits are essentially akin to buying
a stream of credits in an open market air emissions trading
program.
In general, wetlands mitigation banking works as follows.
First, a public or private "bank sponsor" restores, enhances, cre-
ates, or (possibly) preserves an area of wetlands in a particular
region, watershed, or ecosystem.96 The value of these wetlands is
quantified in some way, and assigned wetlands "credits."97 The
credits are then placed in a "wetlands mitigation bank."98 From
this bank, the credits can be purchased and withdrawn by permit-
tees to mitigate wetlands losses within the same region, water-
shed, or ecosystem. 99 Typically, banked wetlands credits continue
91. See WMB-1, supra note 90.
92. See generally ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 26, at §§ 6.2-6.3.
93. Specifically, section 404 requires permits for activities involving the "dis-
charge of dredge or fill material" into "waters of the United States," which includes
most wetlands. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994).
94. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 122 (1999).
95. INST. FOR WATER RESOURCES, WATER RESOURCES SUPPORT CENTER, U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENG'RS, IWR REP. 94-WMB-3, NAT'L WETLAND MITIGATION STUDY, Ex-
PANDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCCESSFUL MITIGATION: THE PRIVATE CREDIT MARKET
ALTERNATIVE 9 (1994) [hereinafter WMB-3].
96. See id. at vii.
97. Credits are derived in terms of either (1) a functional evaluation of habitat
values or similar wetlands values, or (2) acreage of different types of wetlands (e.g.,
forested freshwater or forested saltwater).
98. See WMB-3, supra note 95, at vii.
99. See id. at vii.
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to be generated so long as the wetlands mitigation project
continues.
Wetlands mitigation banking has evolved over time, and has
become increasingly sophisticated. In 1988, twelve banks had
been identified nationally. 10 0 By the summer of 1992, forty-six
such banks had been developed in eighteen states. 101 In 1995,
seventy-seven were identified by the Corps of Engineers. 0 2
Wetlands mitigation banks take three general forms: (a) sin-
gle-user mitigation banks; (b) public commercial banks, including
fee-based mitigation systems ("in-lieu fee systems" or "mitigation
trusts"); and (c) private commercial banks involving mitigation
credit markets. 10 3
a. Single-User Mitigation Banks
As the name implies, single-user mitigation banks are devel-
oped and used exclusively by a single public or private entity to
provide for its own future mitigation needs.104 The first of these
banks came into existence in the mid-1980s as large developers
restored, enhanced, or created large areas of wetlands at some
other location in the state from which they could derive mitigation
credits. 10 5 Of the forty-six wetlands banks in existence in the
summer of 1992, forty were single-user banks.' 0 6 Thirty-four of
the banks were developed for public entities, including state high-
way departments (twenty-two projects in thirteen states), 0 7 port
authorities (five projects), and counties (four projects).' 0 8
100. See WMB-1, supra note 90, at 7.
101. See INST. FOR WATER RESOURCES, WATER RESOURCES SUPPORT CENTER, U.S.
ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, IWa REP 92-WMB-2, NAT'L WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING
STUDY, WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING: RESOURCES DOCUMENT 2 (1994) [hereinafter
WMB-2]; see also INST. FOR WATER RESOURCES, WATER RESOURCES SUPPORT CENTER,
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, IWa REP. 94 -WMB-6, NAT'L WETLAND MITIGATION
STUDY, WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING 4, 131-134 (1994) [hereinafter WMB-6].
102. See INST. FOR WATER RESOURCES, WATER RESOURCES SUPPORT CENTER, U.S.
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, KING AND ASSOC. AND INST. FOR WATER RESOURCES, IWR
REP. 96-WMB-9, NATL WETLAND MITIGATION STUDY--COMMERCIAL WETLAND MITIGA-
TION CREDIT VENTURES: 1995 NAT'L SURVEY 5 (1996) [hereinafter "WMB-9"].
103. See WMB-3, supra note 95, at 12-15.
104. See id. at 13.
105. See id.
106. See id.; see also WMB-2, supra note 101, at 2.
107. See WMB-6, supra note 101, at 4, 131-134. Nearly one-half of existing wet-
lands mitigation banks have been established by state highway departments to miti-
gate against losses caused by highway construction. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note
26, at 32.
108. See WMB-2, supra note 101, at 78-83.
[Vol. 18
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol18/iss1/3
ENVIRONMENTAL TRADING PROGRAMS
For example, in 1988, the Idaho Transportation Department
established a mitigation bank to compensate for wetlands losses
resulting from highway development.' 0 9 The bank consisted of
three separate parcels of marsh, wetlands, and dry land over a
total of 213 acres.110 The banked property could be used in miti-
gation so long as it was within the same watershed, human im-
pact zone, and transportation district as the corresponding
highway project."' Idaho agencies were responsible for evaluat-
ing the bank's wetlands "credits" and "debits" based on functional
wetland replacement units determined under Habitat Evaluation
Procedures (HEPs). 112
b. Public Commercial Mitigation Banks & Fee-Based
Mitigation Programs
In an effort to extend the advantages of wetlands banking to
more permit applications, governmental entities created public
"commercial" banks. 113 Essentially, these publicly-financed banks
offer wetlands mitigation credits for sale to the general public,
with proceeds paying for the construction and management of the
bank.1 4 By 1992, there were five such public commercial banks
in operation. 115 In 1995, there were fifteen in operation, with
thirty other prospective banks in development. 116
One example of such a commercial bank was established in
North Dakota by the State Legislature in 1987.117 The bank is
sponsored by the State, with sites located throughout the state.
The goal was to establish a comprehensive agricultural no-net-
loss-of-wetlands program; clients principally are farmers through-
out the state.118 In 1992, the bank balance consisted of 4,425
credits, resulting from 5,000 acres of credits and 575 acres of deb-
its from 118 debiting transactions." 19
Similar to public commercial banks are public fee-based miti-
gation programs, also known as "in-lieu fee systems" or "mitiga-
109. See id. at 29.
110. See id. at 27-28.
111. See id. at 28.
112. See id. at 27-32.
113. See WMB-3, supra note 95, at 13.
114. See id.
115. See WMB-2, supra note 101, at 78-83. This includes banks that had both pub-
lic and private clients.
116. See WMB-9, supra note 102, at vi, 7-15.
117. See WMB-2, supra note 101, at 63-65.
118. See id.
119. See id.
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tion trusts."120 In these programs, permittees meet their
mitigation responsibilities through payment of permit compensa-
tion fees in lieu of replacing wetlands or obtaining wetlands cred-
its from a bank.12 1 These revenues are then accumulated to fund
future, and theoretically equivalent, replacement of wetlands by
the governmental or non-profit entity. 122
The first fee-based program began in Florida in 1987.123 De-
velopers of wetlands paid fees to the Florida Game and Fresh
Water Fish Commission's Fish and Wildlife Habitat Trust Fund
for the purchase and management of large, ecologically significant
Mitigation Parks (ranging in size from 400 to 1,500 acres). 124
Fees would differ depending on the amount of wetlands developed
and the habitat and species affected. Similar fee-based programs
are utilized in Louisiana and Maryland. 125
c. Private Commercial Mitigation Banks
Private commercial banks constitute the latest wave in wet-
lands mitigation banking.126 Profit-seeking entrepreneurs create
wetlands mitigation banks with private capital and sell mitigation
credits to the general public. 127 To date, federal and state regula-
tors have assumed a very large role in quality assurance for such
banks. 128 Typically, regulators approve the establishment of the
bank, assess the quality and value of the wetlands credits in the
bank, and determine whether a bank's credits may be applied to a
120. See U.S. EPA, Federal Guidance on the Use of In-Lieu-Fee Arrangements for
Compensatory Mitigation Under Section 404 of the CWA and Section 10 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act, available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/regs/inlieufee.pdf
(November 7, 2000).
121. See id.
122. In allowing such "borrowing" against future mitigation, the mitigation banks
differ sharply from any of the current air emission trading programs, which allow no
"borrowing" against future emission reductions.
123. See WMB-2, supra note 101, at 96; See also INST. FOR WATER RESOURCES,
WATER RESOURCES SUPPORT CENTER, US ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, IWR REP. 94-WMB-
5, NATL WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING STUDY, AN EXAMINATION OF WETLAND PRO-
GRAMS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMPENSATORY MITIGATION 68 (1994) [hereinafter WMB-
5]; see also WMB-9, supra note 102, at 6-7.
124. See WMB-9, supra note 102, at 5; see also WMB-5, supra note 123, at 68.
125. See WMB-9, supra note 102, at 22-24; see also WHB-2, supra note 101, at 33-
40.
126. See generally WMB-9, supra note 102.
127. See generally id.
128. See Federal Guidance for Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation
Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58605 (Nov. 28, 1995), available at http'//www.epa.gov/OWOW/
wetlands/mitbankn.html (revised Aug. 21, 1997).
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particular mitigation project. 129 By 1995, nine of twenty-four com-
mercial ventures in operation were privately funded, and twenty-
three other prospective ventures had been identified. 13 0
The first approved private bank was established in 1992 in
Millhaven, Georgia. 131 By late 1995, the bank had completed mit-
igation of approximately one hundred acres and the Army Corps
had approved the sale of thirty acres worth of credits under the
federal section 404 program. 132
2. Effluent Trading
Effluent trading takes several forms, including trading
among point sources and trading between point sources and
nonpoint sources (a practice still unusual in air trading
programs).
a. Trading Between Point Sources
Effluent trading between point sources began in the early
1980s. These programs involve trades of effluent reduction credits
between two or more point source dischargers on the same
waterbody. As in open market air emission trading programs,
credits are created only when a point source reduces discharges of
effluent more than required by the Clean Water Act. In lieu of
upgrading its own pollution controls, a source may purchase cred-
its from another facility that has achieved greater reductions of
pollutant loads than required by, for example, installing new
technology.
Wisconsin created the first such program in 1981.133 The
State allowed trading of biological oxygen demand (BOD) in two
rivers - among twenty-one parties along a thirty-five mile stretch
of the Fox River, and among twenty-six parties along the five hun-
dred miles of Wisconsin River. Trading, however, has been slow,
in part because of severe regulatory restrictions imposed on
trades, and in part because of the potential for legal challenge of
trading as inconsistent with the Clean Water Act.' 34
129. See id.
130. See WMB-9, supra note 102, at vi, 7-12 (including Table 1).
131. See id. at 10.
132. See id.
133. See Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. NR 212 (Sept. 2000).
134. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 6-29; see also OFFICE OF WATER AND
POLICY PLANNING AND EVALUATION, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND
FEASIBILITY OF EFFLUENT TRADING BETWEEN POINT SOURCES: AN ANALYSIS IN SUP-
PORT OF CLEAN WATER ACT AUTHORIZATION (1993).
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b. Trading Between Point and Non-point Sources
These trading programs contemplate transactions between
traditional point sources, such as manufacturing facilities, and
"non-point" sources, such as farmers or livestock producers whose
practices cause harmful runoffs to the same waterbody. 135 Nor-
mally, the non-point pollutant reductions are achieved by employ-
ing management practices that effectively reduce non-point
pollutant runoff to a waterbody.
In 1997, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) es-
tablished some of the more sophisticated policy guidelines for
point/non-point pollutant trading.136 Not only does the guidance
allow a point source to offset exceedences of effluent limitations by
carrying out non-point riparian enhancements upriver, but it also
allows the source to do so by trading different pollutants.137
For example, the MPCA gave one point source, a brewery,
permission under its NPDES permit to discharge additional car-
bonaceous biochemical oxygen demand (CBOD5) effluent to the
Minnesota River, provided that it offset the environmentally
harmful effects of the additional discharges by reducing phosphor-
ous loadings upriver.138 The brewery was required to achieve en-
vironmentally equivalent reductions through conversion of
sufficient farmland to riparian zones and wetlands. The
equivalency between CBOD 5 discharges in the lower Minnesota
River and the phosphorous loadings upstream was determined
based on complex biochemical relationships.
To date, MPCA has approved two trades that will allow the
brewing company to offset the CBOD 5 loadings at the plant by re-
ducing non-point phosphorous loadings upriver. In the first, the
brewing company purchased forty acres of farmland near the
mouth of a tributary to the Minnesota River and is converting it
from agricultural use to native vegetation. 39 MPCA has con-
cluded that the conversion will significantly reduce soil erosion
and change the land parcel from an area of degradation into an
area of aggradation.140 In other words, the parcel becomes a sink
135. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 6-31. While point/non-point trades are
considered acceptable in the context of the Clean Water Act, they are generally not
seen as acceptable under Clean Air Act trading programs.
136. See NoRmAN SENJEM, WATER QUALITY DIscussIoN, MINNESOTA POLLUTION
CONTROL (1997).
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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rather than a source of phosphorous-bearing sediment. The sec-
ond trade involves the brewing company's purchase of a sixty-two
acre riparian area, the point of an isthmus that extends into the
river. As this parcel is converted from farmland to mixed grass
and wooded vegetation, it too becomes an area of aggradation, in-
stead of degradation, and reduces the phosphorous loading on the
Minnesota River.
As part of its "reinvention" initiative, the Clinton Administra-
tion promoted growth of effluent trading programs, like the one in
Minnesota, to achieve further reductions of water pollution.141 In
May 1996, EPA issued its Draft Framework for Watershed-Based
Trading. 142 The framework provides a clear presentation of rele-
vant issues and a structured analytical means for examining vari-
ous state and local effluent trading initiatives.
II. Issues in the Design of Market-Based Transactions
Regimes
As Part I described, market-based programs are now common
in American environmental regulation. Starting from the EPA
offset and bubble policies, which allowed rudimentary trading
only in very circumscribed circumstances, trading programs have
become increasingly common, particularly under the Clean Air
Act. But policymakers remain reluctant to venture beyond trades
of emissions of identical substances. The increasing trade in wet-
lands acreage is an important exception to this rule.
A. Common Design Elements in Trading Systems
There are potentially significant benefits to society in apply-
ing market-based regulation more broadly. This section derives a
set of considerations with regard to the design of market-based
programs that will allow policymakers to consider extending mar-
ket principles into additional areas of environmental regula-
tion. 143 These considerations exist in any pollution regulatory
system. Indeed, this analysis shows that command and control
141. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, President William Clinton and Vice President Al
Gore, "Reinventing Environmental Regulation": Clinton Administration Regulatory
Reform Initiatives (Mar. 16, 1995), http://www.epa.gov/opeihome/rpubsinfo/marchl6
1995.htm.
142. See OFFICE OF WATER, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY PUB. 800-R-96-001, DRAFT
FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSHED-BASE TRADING (1996).
143. See id. at ch. 2 (lists "Principles for Trading").
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regulation is in fact a special case, and not an opposite from mar-
ket-based regulation.
This discussion focuses on six issues that a policymaker must
address in designing a market-based regulatory system. These in-
clude the geographical area included within the trading system,
the allowable spatial relationship between parties to a transac-
tion, the types of pollution sources or others who may engage in
trading, and issues related to quality assurance and enforceabil-
ity. "Cap and trade" systems present two unique issues - deter-
mining a baseline and allocating emission rights.
1. Determining the Scope and Geographical Extent of the
Market
The initial design step, prior to determining whether a trad-
ing system can be helpful, must be to identify the resource to be
protected and the source of threats to that resource. Once these
questions are answered, the policymaker must determine the geo-
graphical extent of the market-based system. The concept of a
"shed," defined by reference to the resource to be protected, is crit-
ical to the design of a market-based regulatory system. 144 The ap-
propriate "shed" would include the entire area that affects the
resource in question. Thus, depending on the nature of the re-
source, the "shed" may range greatly in size. The watershed for a
high mountain lake, for example, may be limited to just a few
square miles or less. The relevant airshed for addressing acid
rain, on the other hand, includes at least the eastern half of the
country and part of Canada - the area within which transported
acid gas emissions have an affect on forests, soils, lakes, and
humans.
2. Geographical Relationship Between Parties
In addition to defining the relevant resource "shed" for pur-
poses of structuring a trading system, a policymaker must also
consider the acceptable spatial relationships between trading
partners. This involves two issues.
First, there is the proximity of the participants in a transac-
tion to each other and to the affected resources and people. This is
relevant to whether there is tolerable equivalence in environmen-
tal effect between the emissions or discharges of the generator and
user of credits or allowances. For example, if discharges from a
144. See id. at 2-8 (the importance of this concept is recognized).
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paper mill at one end of a long lake do not reach the resort at the
other end, then a reduction in biological oxygen demand from the
mill should not be able to create credits that can be used to enable
discharges into the water at the resort end of the lake. When
proximity is ignored, environmental justice issues are often
created.
Second, there may be an issue of directionality. Direction of
flow, particularly of air or water, often bears an important rela-
tion to environmental quality. For example, given the prevailing
southwest-to-northeast airflow along the East Coast, reductions in
nitrogen oxide emissions in Pennsylvania may improve ozone air
quality in New Jersey, but reductions in Connecticut are unlikely
to affect air quality in Maryland. An appropriate trading system
for nitrogen oxide emissions designed as part of an ozone control
program would therefore allow credits created by surplus emis-
sion reductions in Pennsylvania to be used by emitters in New
Jersey, but would not allow Maryland sources to use credits cre-
ated by emission reductions in Connecticut.
Not all pollution problems present problems of directionality.
For some air or watersheds, the affected resource is sufficiently
small that, for practical purposes, any emission or discharge can
be considered to affect the entire resource, rather than flowing
from one place to another. In the case of acid rain, on the other
hand, the National Academy of Sciences suggested that the prob-
lem was sufficiently ubiquitous145 and the sulfur emissions that
caused acid rain sufficiently mixed across the eastern United
States, so that reductions anywhere within that entire area could
be considered roughly equivalent in terms of their effect on the
environment. The issue of directionality does not arise in every
context, but it is present for many environmental problems where
air and water trading programs have been considered.
To the extent that a trading system must deal with a pollu-
tant whose effects are directional, the trading program must take
directionality into account in any transactions. Typically, this
would be done by either prohibiting "wrong direction" trading, or,
where directionality is less clear, by attaching conditions that
make such trades less attractive.
145. See, e.g., Henry A. Waxman, Overview and Critique: An Overview of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 1721, 1790 (1991) (citing several major
reports by the National Academy of Science).
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3. Types of Pollution Sources Permitted to be Traded
The benefits of market-based regulation, like those of product
markets, are a function of the size of the market. The greater the
percentage of the total emissions included in the market, the
lower the average cost of meeting any given regulatory require-
ment and the greater the other benefits of the market, such as
technological innovation. If the architects of a trading system
limit the ways salable emission credits can be created, they limit
the supply of credits available for sale. If they limit the regulatory
requirements that can be met using credits, they limit the demand
for credits and undermine the incentive to undertake additional
pollution reductions to create credits. Either type of limitation
reduces the potential economic and social benefits of trading. 146
So far, air regulators have been reluctant to allow trading
among stationary, mobile, and area sources, even though most
would admit that allowing such trades would markedly improve
the cost-effectiveness of the nation's air pollution control program.
It is generally acknowledged, for example, that the cost per ton of
additional reductions in NOx emissions from today's new cars is
five or more times that of reductions from many stationary
sources. Emission reductions from area sources unregulated
under the current Clean Air Act program are no doubt substan-
tially less expensive yet.
One key applicability issue is whether emission reductions at
sources that are not currently regulated can create emission
rights that regulated entities can use for compliance. Air regula-
tory agencies often place limits on the ability of unregulated
146. The recent shortages of electricity in California have shown why it is impor-
tant to include many different kinds of emissions sources in emission markets.
Southern California's RECLAIM market for emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides,
as described above, includes only a few hundred sources, with the bulk of the RE-
CLAIM allowance being used by electric generating stations. Faced with a sudden
shortage of electric power from out-of-state, State regulators and utilities pressed
high emitting California "peaking" units into baseline service. The sudden demand
for RECLAIM allowances could not be met, and the SCAQMD has been forced to al-
low emissions that are in violation of the rules of the RECLAIM market.
Under the circumstances, SCAQMD's choices were: (1) to issue "Variances" that
would legalize the emissions, but completely destroy the credibility of the RECLAIM
system; (2) to allow utilities to "borrow" allowances against future supply; or (3) to
"print money," legalizing the excess emissions in return for utility contributions to a
fund to pay for emission reductions from other emission sources within the Los Ange-
les basin. SCAQMD chose the third of these options-in effect a post-hoc recognition
that the initial RECLAIM market did not include a broad or diverse enough base of
emission sources.
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sources to create credits. This is largely based on fears about
whether the reductions would have occurred anyway, and con-
cerns about verification. However, water regulators take a differ-
ent view. Essentially all of the "credits" available in most wetland
banks have been created by actions taken by unregulated entities
to create wetlands from lands that were not regulated as wetlands
under the Clean Water Act.
4. Determining a Baseline
For "cap and trade" systems, determining an appropriate
emissions or discharge "baseline" is critical to achieving the envi-
ronmental objective of the program. If halving the concentration
of a pollutant in a water body is the objective, other things being
equal, a policy to halve total discharges into the water body will be
necessary. But these "other things" are often not equal. Unless
current discharges are known, it will be impossible to determine
how many allowances may be given out in conformity with that
policy objective.
The calculation is further complicated where the discharge or
emission undergoes chemical or physical transformation in the en-
vironment. For example, since tropospheric ozone is the result of
complex chemical reactions in the atmosphere involving nitrogen
oxides and both natural and manmade hydrocarbons which are
driven by the energy of sunlight, a straight-line extrapolation be-
tween reductions in emissions of nitrogen oxides and in ozone con-
centrations significantly oversimplifies reality.
While the baseline concept is easy to grasp in the abstract, in
practice it is often impossible to achieve a precise understanding
of the reductions in emissions or water discharges needed to
achieve a stated air or water quality goal. Our understanding of
the complex chemistry of air and water bodies and the diffusion of
pollutants is not adequate to allow much precision. For this rea-
son the apparent precision of "cap and trade" systems may often
be illusory.
5. Allocation of Emission Rights
The governmental allocation of emission rights is a second
major design issue for "cap and trade" emission trading sys-
tems.147 The need to allocate emission rights distinguishes "cap
147. OFFICE OF WATER, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY Pun. 800-R-96-001, DAFT FRAME-
WORK FOR WATERSHED-BASE TRADING 5-10 (1996). EPA has recognized the impor-
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and trade" systems from other market-based pollution control sys-
tems such as auctions, open market emission trading systems, or
emission taxes. 148 The system for allocating rights, whether ex-
plicit or implicit, is analogous to any other government subsidy or
grant of rights to resources or other assets. It has significant fi-
nancial consequences for the regulated entities. As a conse-
quence, it can create significant political stress on the
policymakers - enough to dramatically affect the program's eco-
nomic efficiency in some cases.
It is important to recognize the political nature of the alloca-
tion process, because the politics of setting emission limitations is
often identified as a criticism of the "command and control" sys-
tem. But as anyone who has read section 405 of the Clean Air Act
(the acid rain allowance allocation scheme) understands, the same
forces shape decisions about who gets how much of the air re-
source allocated to them.
Under the acid rain program and other "cap and trade" pro-
grams, a source must possess allowances in an amount equal to its
emissions. The allocation of allowances, whether considered a li-
cense or a property right,149 represents a transfer of a value from
the government to the regulated entities. In these systems, the
transfer is explicit 50 and, therefore, highly politicized. In the acid
rain program, in order to minimize political opposition, allowances
were allocated with a formula that assured the greatest number
went to those who had the highest emissions. The process of allo-
cating nitrogen oxide emissions allowances to states within the
northeastern Ozone Transport Region was also highly politicized.
In Los Angeles, the logrolling in the RECLAIM allocation process
became so extreme that it threatened the viability of the program.
As the author has argued elsewhere, in such a politicized process,
the temptation to solve political problems by creating additional
allowances is almost irresistible.' 15
tance of the allocation decision, without recognizing that it is a problem only in "cap
and trade" systems. See id.
148. In an auction scheme, all emission rights must be purchased by potential
users. Emission tax schemes do not provide for any allocation of rights, since they
simply impose a tax on whatever the source emits. It is, of course, possible to imagine
an emission tax scheme with exemptions for a certain amount of emissions. In effect,
such a system would be allocating emission rights also.
149. See CAA § 403(f).
150. See id. §§ 404-405 (the formula for the allocation of acid rain allowances). The
Ozone Transport Commission made an initial allocation by state. Each state must
then develop its own formula for allocating to sources within the state.
151. See Ayres, supra note 10.
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The allocation of emission rights in a "cap and trade" system
does not necessarily have to be done according to previous emis-
sions, as it was (roughly) in the acid rain program and the Ozone
Transport Region's state allocations. For example, a "Generation
Performance Standard" (GPS) has been suggested for use in the
regional NOx emissions control program that has been proposed
by EPA.152 Under this concept, allowances would be allocated by
reference to the electricity generated by a unit rather than by ref-
erence to the pollution emitted in a base year. 5 3 To determine the
GPS, the regulatory body would determine the total emissions
that could be allowed, consistent with the environmental objec-
tive. 154 This total would then be divided by the total electricity
generated in the base year, to establish an emission rate, which
would then become the GPS. 155 Under the GPS proposal, each
regulated generating unit would be subject to the same standard.
The same GPS would apply to every unit, regardless of the unit's
previous emission rate. In order to be sure that the GPS was in
fact achieving the emission reductions expected, the regulatory
agency would periodically reexamine the actual electricity genera-
tion.156 If total generation exceeded the amount assumed in the
original GPS calculation, the GPS would be recalculated in the
same manner as the initial calculation, dividing the desired total
emissions by the increased amount of generation. The resulting
tighter emission limitation would then become the revised GPS.157
In an open market system, credits are created by investments
that reduce emissions below the current emissions or the applica-
ble emission limitation, whichever is less. 158 This is a fundamen-
tal tenet of the open market paradigm developed in the
NESCAUIVMARAMA demonstration project, 159 and incorporated
in the open market air regulations adopted by a number of
states. °60 Wetland banks are built on the same principle - wet-
lands credits are created by investing in actions that create wet-
152. See 63 Fed. Reg. 56,356 (proposed Oct. 21, 1998). The Generation Perform-
ance Standard was proposed by Public Service Electric & Gas of New Jersey and the
Natural Resources Defense Council.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See NESCAUM/MARAMA, supra note 53.
159. See id.
160. See id.
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lands or restore wetlands that currently do not perform the
ecological functions of a healthy wetland. 161
As the author has noted elsewhere, since open market sys-
tems do not have an allocation process, they are not subject to the
political logrolling associated with "cap and trade" systems.162
6. Quality Assurance
Since emission trading allows one source to emit or discharge
more than otherwise allowed by law, a major design issue for such
systems is the mechanism for insuring the credits (or allowances)
proffered to make up for the excess emissions or discharges actu-
ally representing the emission or discharge reductions claimed.
This issue involves two questions: (1) to what extent is it possible
to measure accurately either the emission reductions that create
the credits (or free up the allowances) or the emissions that use
them; and (2) what structure will assure to an acceptable degree
that the seller of credits (or allowances) is representing truthfully
the emission or discharge reductions beyond requirements that
are alleged to create the credits (or allowances).
For purposes of this discussion, the policy responses to these
questions can be summarized into two market paradigms: the
"commodity paradigm," and the "product paradigm." Those who
subscribe to the commodity paradigm picture the environmental
trading system in commodity or even currency trading terms.
Thus, they picture trading essentially in terms of transactions in-
volving identical, fungible quantities of standard value. In the
acid rain program, for example, the buyer of allowance receives
government issued paper that allows the buyer to emit an indi-
cated number of tons of SOx. 163 In this system, standardized mea-
surement techniques are imposed by the government as a means
of establishing allowance quality.164 In such a market, transac-
tion costs are minimized. But such a market is of limited use, be-
cause relatively few situations offer the needed uniformity. The
commodity paradigm does not apply, for example, whenever dis-
tance or directionality matter - which is the majority of pollution
situations.1 65
161. See WMB-2, supra note 101.
162. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 6-1.
163. See Burtraw, supra note 5, at 1.
164. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 75.
165. See id.
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The product paradigm begins with the notion that a broad
universe of actions that reduce emissions should be capable of cre-
ating tradeable credits. In this paradigm, an entity that reduces
emissions to below an applicable emission limitation or current
emissions, whichever is lower, can create an emission "product"
that it can sell.166 Rather than all being identical, however, these
products have varying bundles of attributes, for example, the rela-
tionship in time and space to the user, type of measurement, and
credibility of the creator.
Rather than a single government-prescribed means of assur-
ing credit quality, the product paradigm assumes a variety of pol-
icy instruments to control credit quality, varying from regulations
through guidance documents to individual "comfort letters."167
Rather than assuming that direct enforcement is sufficient to pre-
vent dishonest trading, the government may use elements of the
private marketplace, such as private auditors and attorneys em-
ployed by buyers, to interpret government policy and advise their
clients how to assure their credits are marketable and will be ac-
cepted by government as genuine. 168
Quality control issues have often been oversimplified, as if
they were binary in nature. Thus, a system, it is sometimes im-
plied, either does or does not assure that trades fully protect the
public interest. But the notion of "quality assurance" may be a
more appropriate concept here. This notion recognizes that cer-
tainty is not possible. Instead, it focuses on the balance between
the degree of certainty on the one hand, and the benefits that flow
from trading on the other.
An analogy to the credit practices of banks may illuminate the
point. Consider two hypothetical banks with different policies to-
ward granting credit. Bank Number One provides credit only to a
select group of customers who meet strict accounting criteria, and
agree to provide quarterly financial reports to the bank detailing
their financial transactions. Bank Number Two issues credit
cards to virtually any customer, and provides loans based on a rel-
atively simple net-worth form, supplemented with routine credit
checks at the time the loan is made.
There can be little doubt that Bank Number One will have
fewer loan defaults than Bank Number Two. On the other hand,
it seems equally certain that Bank Number One will pay for its
166. See Ayres, supra note 10.
167. See id.
168. See id.
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enviable record on loan defaults by drastically limiting its clien-
tele. Bank Number Two, in contrast, has accepted that its ap-
proach to banking will produce a greater number of loan defaults,
but balancing the value of the much greater banking business it
can capture, has decided that the additional defaults are accept-
able. Everyone knows there will be a few deadbeats, but given the
benefits of a worldwide financial credit system, there is sufficient
quality control. Insurance and other means are available to limit
the risks inherent in the system.
The designers of emission trading systems face quality assur-
ance issues analogous to those faced by the two banks in the hypo-
thetical described above. Quality assurance is necessary for a
trading system to work. On the other hand, each degree of cer-
tainty is purchased at the price of limiting the benefits of the trad-
ing system.
Thus, for example, the certainty supplied by the elaborate
stack-testing program of the acid rain trading system cannot be
duplicated for emission sources that have no stacks. While EPA
rhetoric usually fails to acknowledge this trade off, the agency
often adopts or supports trading systems in both air and water
pollution contexts that accept less rigid quality assurance systems
than that of the acid rain program in order to obtain the benefits
of trading. For example, EPA recently proposed a "self-certifying
process" for a trading system that is part of a proposed regulation
to set low sulfur standards for gasoline. 169
III. Extending Trading Programs Into Environmental
Regulation
In the previous section, the issue of quality control was identi-
fied as the fundamental limitation on the expansion of environ-
mental trading. Today, the largest potential benefits from
environmental trading are available from transactions involving
unregulated, or little-regulated, sources. For air pollution, these
include: (1) small "area sources," such as small boilers, outboard
motors, lawn mowers, weed whackers, etc.; (2) consumer products
such as hair sprays; and (3) practices that use energy inef-
ficiently.-7 0 For water pollution, "non-point" discharges from agri-
169. 64 Fed. Reg. 26004, 26057 (proposed May 13, 1999).
170. See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 94; 40 C.F.R. pt. 9 §§ 86, 89; 40 C.F.R. pt. 89. The
EPA is currently moving to regulate off-road engines, which would otherwise be in-
cluded in this list. EPA regulations for small, handheld engines such as those used on
"weed whackers" and chainsaws become effective in 2005-7.
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cultural land, urban runoff and water use practices have the
potential for substantial arbitrage with the industrial and munici-
pal dischargers who are already subject to significant regulation.
These unregulated, or little-regulated, sources share characteris-
tics that make direct command and control regulation unlikely to
be successful: they are individually small, but very numerous; and
attempting to regulate them risks political backlash because it
would directly affect large segments of the public. 171 Also, in most
cases, measuring emissions or discharges directly is difficult, im-
possible and/or prohibitively expensive.
In some cases involving these kinds of sources, a transaction
can only be conducted in the metric of environmental quality
rather than the intermediary of emissions or discharges. Exam-
ples include the Minnesota PCA's agreement to allow upriver re-
ductions in phosphorous loadings to be used to authorize higher
biological oxygen demand at a downstream brewery. 172 Another is
the New Jersey DEP's decision to allow restoration of ten thou-
sand acres of wetlands rather than insisting on construction of a
cooling tower on the Salem nuclear power plant.173
To reap the potential benefits of low cost reductions in pollu-
tion from these sources, incentive-based regulation is essential.
Thus it becomes critical to develop an acceptable quality control
regime to allow transactions to occur between such sources and
the heavily regulated industrial and motor vehicle sector.
This regime will not be supplied by the commodity paradigm,
because it is too rigid. In that paradigm, quality control is accom-
plished by drastically limiting the acceptable means of demon-
strating that the quantities being sold and used are the same as
smokestack monitoring. Thus, the commodity paradigm is self-
limiting to trades involving sources with smokestacks that can be
monitored. It drastically limits society's ability to obtain the bene-
fits of environmental trading because it cannot accommodate the
transactions that have the greatest arbitrage.
What is needed is a paradigm that can deal flexibly with qual-
ity control issues in order to facilitate trades involving the great-
171. See generally VEHICLE EMISSION STUDY, supra note 17. Any attempt to regu-
late emissions of carbon dioxide faces the same issues. Since atmospheric loadings of
CO 2 can be achieved by fuel switching, changes in energy sources or cycles, and in-
creasing the capacity of "sinks," such as forests, with widely varying cost-effective-
ness, the potential arbitrage is staggering.
172. See generally id. See also NORMAN SENJEM, WATER QUALITY DISCUSSION,
MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL (1997).
173. See generally VEHICLE EMISSION STUDY, supra note 17.
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est arbitrage. Like a product market, it would accommodate the
many varied bundles of attributes from credits produced from
non-industrial sources. The objective of the paradigm should be to
obtain acceptable accuracy in determining decreases in emissions
or discharges associated with environmental trades. A concept of
acceptable accuracy allows for error in any given transaction, so
long as the inaccuracies are not biased in one direction. 174 Accept-
ability is a concept that balances the social benefits of trading and
the emission reduction losses caused by crediting lesser quality
credits.
Those who have doubts about taking such a "product" ap-
proach often raise two important points. First, they point out that
errors in quantifying credits for trading in an environmental trad-
ing system are not likely to be random. Companies have a finan-
cial incentive to overestimate their "overcontrol" of emissions or
discharges, claiming more credits than they should; or to underes-
timate the emissions or discharges in excess of relevant limits,
thus using fewer credits than they should. This is certainly true,
but what it suggests is that any workable system will need to take
on the issue of bias directly. A detailed review of these issues in
the open market context was undertaken in the NESCAUM/
MARAMA demonstration project, 175 where representatives of
state government, industry, and the environmental community
worked through the issues identified above, with particular atten-
tion to the quality control issue.' 76
Several structural means to provide quality control within the
product market paradigm have been suggested by the NESCAUM/
MARAMA demonstration project and others. Some have sug-
gested that making the user of credits responsible to the govern-
ment for the quality of the credits used would assure acceptable
quality.' 77 To provide buyers with assurances, they argue that a
private auditing and legal advisory system would grow up and
would, as it has in the case of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission regulation or the income tax system, assure acceptable
quality control.
174. See generally Ayres, supra note 10. While the current command and control
system on paper requires zero errors in measuring emissions, in reality it accepts
large inaccuracy and bias because official tests of emissions discharges are so rare.
175. See NESCAUMMARAMA, supra note 53.
176. See id.
177. See id.; see also Suzi KERR ET AL., CENTER FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY, POLICY OP-
TIONS FOR ADDRESSING COMPLIANCE ISsUES RAISED BY EMISSIONS TRADING (Nov. 1998).
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Some distrust this view because they fear collusion between
buyer and seller. They suggest alternatives that would require
third party participation in transactions. Thus, the New Jersey
open market system requires State-licensed verifiers to examine
and approve claimed emission credits before they can be sold.
Another approach would use private purchasing entities,
whose business reputation and interest in long term participation
in the market provide strong incentives to assure the quality of
any credits purchased. While air regulators have been reticent to
use it, this approach has been used in the open market context of
wetlands banking, mentioned previously.
Yet another approach would be to create an independent gov-
ernmental purchasing authority, along the lines of quasi-indepen-
dent water and sewer authorities, which would verify the quality
of credits. This approach is commonly used for wetlands banking,
and is now being urged in southern California for air credits. 178
Such a public authority could be financed through a revolving
fund using funds from general tax revenues or a special tax levied
on emitters. It could use these funds to create a bank of credits
by, for example, providing financial inducements for homeowners
to replace old gasoline-powered lawnmowers with new electric or
catalyst-equipped models. Alternatively, the authority could be
allowed to fund itself by selling credits, then using the resulting
fund to pay for actions that reduce emissions by a greater amount.
Over time, the authority should be able to "retire" a significant
amount of credits, thereby contributing to improved air quality -
in effect, contributing the arbitrage to the public in the form of
better air quality.
Proponents of this approach believe that by placing the qual-
ity assurance function in the hands of a public agency, it would
eliminate the potential for bias and self-dealing inherent in pri-
vate quality assurance. Whether such a quasi-governmental au-
thority could also eliminate the bureaucratic pace and possibly
excessive caution of a government agency is an open question.
In addition to the bias argument, some argue that the transaction
costs associated with quality assurance of credits will hobble trad-
ing. Those who raise this point often fail to identify their assump-
178. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE DrviSION (1999). The World Bank
recently created a Prototype Carbon Fund, designed to facilitate carbon trading under
an international global warming regime. Funded by several European countries and
corporations, its objective is to obtain "high quality emission reductions" that can
later be used to comply with international carbon reduction requirements.
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tions. Without question, potential traders do take transaction
costs into account, and will only trade if the arbitrage available
exceeds the transaction costs. The acid rain program has extraor-
dinarily low transaction costs, but SO 2 allowances also offer a
rather small arbitrage of less than $200 per ton at this writing. It
is clear that substantially greater arbitrage is available for NOx
and other pollutants in many places, particularly if trading be-
tween industrial and area sources is permitted.
Transaction costs will certainly fall as government agencies
become more comfortable with transactions that go beyond the
commodity or currency-trading model. But even at the current
levels, transactions in NOx emissions have been occurring at
prices below $1000 per ton.179
In a product paradigm market structure, credit quality is an
attribute of the credit "product," which affects the price.180 The
quality of the demonstration becomes an issue between the buyer
and seller, with government supervision or third party involve-
ment, not just a matter between each party and the government.
In such a market, credit consumers weigh the qualities of products
with different attributes, not just the cost of identical items.
Credit quality becomes a competitive factor in the market.
Thus, the next stage in the development of trading is the re-
finement of trading concepts to provide wider opportunities for the
creation and use of credits. While the commodity trading para-
digm embodied in the acid rain program has received much of the
attention, a more flexible product paradigm has been growing
alongside it which offers the opportunity to capture far more of the
potential economic and other benefits of trading. This product
paradigm has begun to provide a mechanism for transactions be-
tween highly regulated industrial sources and unregulated or lit-
tle regulated "area" sources. It can also be used for transactions
where environmental quality is the metric, rather than emissions
or discharges. Reaching this next stage will require further devel-
opment of structures to provide quality assurance and limit the
potential for bias. It will also require regulators to accept a
broader range of credit creation strategies and uses than they
have in the past. It also demands a clear-eyed assessment of the
quality assurance under today's command and control system,
compared with the protections that can be built into market
structures.
179. See Burtraw, supra note 5.
180. See Ayres, supra note 10.
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